on January 2 in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) kindling of discord and shaking of national unity" executed the Shiite preacher and one of leaders of the Saudi opposition Nimr an-Nimra, sentenced to death even in the fall 2014 for appeals to mass actions, with the formulation ". Execution caused big indignation and protest actions in Shiites across all Middle East. The sheikh an-Nimr had reputation of the peacekeeper, and in court, without denying political charges, emphasized that never called for violence. In Iran indignation was so strong that diplomatic missions of Saudi Arabia were crushed, and that in turn in the evening on January 3 broke off diplomatic relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI). Saudi Arabia had an opportunity to compel Iran to sharp steps and by that to break its begun rapprochement with the West. However, according to the interlocutor "the Expert of Online", will not go for direct vengeance of IRI. Nevertheless the Middle Eastern political landscape changes rather strongly.
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of Who such sheikh an-Nimr Executed Iran? In what its symbolism? Than it annoyed sauditam? And why he should be executed?
of An-Nimr was the representative of young generation of Shiite preachers in Saudi Arabia which – unlike the senior generation – more freely and actively speaks about provision of a Shiite community almost deprived of civil rights in the Kingdom. In 2011th it publicly supported demonstrations of Shiites in East province who demanded carrying out reforms in the country and the organization of elections in local bodies of the province. However never thus stated any slogan in favor of violent fight against the authorities.
It, by the way, was popular not only among Shiites, but also small, but nevertheless parts of the Sunni population which was dissatisfied with policy of a ruling dynasty. Also Nimr an-Nimr reached such popularity because the position formuriroval not only and not so much confessional terms, and social and political – told about dictatorship, corruption and social injustice.
of What in general was the politician king Salman concerning the Shiite population, than it differed from the line of the predecessor, the king Abdalla? The begun Shiite performances in KSA are how serious? May they lead to any serious transformation of domestic policy of the Saudi management?
the Previous king Abdalla made by em a lot of things for reconciliation with a Shiite community and many in KSA did not love it for it. Abdalla created Council of national assembly for the purpose of the solution of conflict questions with Shiites nine years ago. However, Council did not earn, but nevertheless Abdalla gave any freedom to Shiites. There was, for example, such case about 5-6 years ago: because of column falling in one of the southern regions of the country some tens people which part appeared Shiites, part – salafitami were lost. By order of Abdalla for victims organized the general procession on which acted both Shiite preachers, and salafitsky. It caused a certain optimism among Shiites, and pessimism among part of a dynasty. That's it this part is represented also by Salman, which not against any social reforms, but in any way in the confessional. For it all Shiites of the country – agents of Iran.
For this reason can tellthat, despite all internal factors, execution an-Nimra has not a direct bearing on processes in the most Saudi Arabia. It is rather frank call to Iran. And it is a call without any obvious prize for KSA, and rather symbolical which sources should be looked for in despair sauditov concerning fast loss of the positions by them in the region: in Syria Islamists recede, in Iraq governmental army and the Shiite militia, both supported and in many respects controlled by Tehran, move to Mosul, Yemen husity not only are not won, but also began rockets to fire at KSA territory.
On this background execution an-Nimra looks as a despair step: KSA we cannot win against Iran the region, and in the person of the Shiite sheikh an-Nimra decided "to execute" Iran at home.
of But whether the begun Shiite protests can bring Shiites in Saudi Arabia to change of repressive policy королевства?
Выступления without active external factor will be easily suppressed by the authorities. The major external factor which can change a situation, is Yemen. If there husity succeed, the Shiite armed factor will be thrown through border and sauditam it is necessary not to suppress any more demonstrations, and to be at war at home. I am sure that it will occur sooner or later, it is rather after Iranians, having finished the tasks in Syria and Iraq, will start being engaged in Yemen more actively. Saudita it well understand, but anything with it cannot do: to their era the end in the region comes.
Answers to peripheries
of As far as predicted? It is really national protest or the directed action of the Iranian authorities?
Ya I do not doubt that those who came to protests, made it because of frank indignation. But that Molotov's cocktails departed to Embassy of Saudi Arabia, says that the authorities made nothing in order that they did not depart. The quantity protesting was not such that security forces could not remove them. And it is necessary to tell that the building KSA embassy rather long time irritates the authorities of Iran. On the one hand in IRI capital Tehran lives more than one million Sunnites, on the other hand at them is not present in the capital of any mosque. And the most religious part of Sunni minority went on a Friday prayer to a mosque of embassy of KSA where was exposed to rather active promotion of the salafitsky direction of Islam.
of the Rupture of diplomatic relations from KSA is an answer to defeat of embassy and rigid statements of the Iranian leaders or a step of Riyadh towards further escalation? Whether this escalation of KSA is necessary? to Escalation of KSA is necessary to em and, moreover, the direct stroke of Iranians to Saudi Arabia proceeds from interests of Riyadh. It becomes a reason for unity of the active coalition against IRI, from participation in which will not be able to slip away and Washington (it from 1951st year is connected with Riyadh the contract on mutual defense). Besides, the blow of IRI will give a direct reason for a final decision of a Shiite problem in the most Saudi Arabia: if Tehran revenges war for an-Nimra, an-Nimr really was their spy and those who supported him – too the Iranian spies. All this logical row will come to the end with that Shiites will be declared by public enemies and Islam, with all that it implies. Iran perfectly realizes all these consequences of direct vengeance, and to it will not go. I am not inclined to think not that in policy of IRI something will significantly change. Iranians are occupied by to reserve Syria and not to allow the Iraq Kurds to take Mosul. These tasks proceed from national interests of IRI, and the revenge for execution an-Nimra does not solve any problem. The only thing that I expect, is more active support to Shiites in Yemen not to give sauditam any chance to take control over the country. KSA it is necessary to answer through the conflicts peripheries, but here a problem - everywhere, where it is possible (Iraq, Syria and Yemen) KSA beats, but loses. of Who from the Saudi allies supported KSA and who stood aside? And why? 2-3 more countries Think after Bahrain and Sudan will withdraw ambassadors from Tehran, but further anything serious will not be. Qatar, despite an active anti-Iranian spirit of ruling elite, is closely connected with Iran a field South Pars which development cannot threaten. Oman rather actively is engaged in normalization of the relations with Iran. Egypt sauditov will not support because saudity today would represent for Cairo about lshy threat, than Iranians. Even Turkey which signed recently the agreement on joint safety with KSA, on direct damage of the relations with Tehran, especially against problems with Moscow, will not go. of performances in Bahrain are How serious? Considering discontent with the Saudi occupation of part of local elite led by how I understand, the crown prince, whether they can lead to an exit of Bahrain from KSA submission? I do not think as in case of a conclusion of armed forces of KSA from Bahrain Sunnites will not be able to keep the power. In recent years the Shiite majority became rather organized, there constantly reveal tens members of Lebanese "Hizballah" (the authorities even entered something similar not a visa regime with Lebanon and let to the country only the Sunni citizens or Christians). But, as last year it appeared, hundreds Shiites make the way in Baykhreyn with the false documents, received from Christian churches of Lebanon. Therefore Bahrain from sauditov cannot refuse in any way.