The infinite Balkans and Turkey in the history of Russian Federation: one more episode

who, first of all, was afraid of military failures and strain of relations with England. As for Nikolaevich Nicholas, he continued to change own plans. The grand duke still planned to be limited to supervision over Rushchuk, having refused storm of this fortress; to wait for reinforcements after what to throw one of cases for the Balkans. Rushchuk was decently strengthened, on positions there was a numerous modern artillery. The emperor did not support this offer since considered fast approach for the Balkans dangerous while in hands of Turks are Rushchuk, Shumla, Nikopol and Plevna. The news coming from army, frightened not only the Russian diplomats, but also the sultan, however, for other reason.

About the moods reigning at the beginning of July in Constantinople, the telegram sent on July 2, 1877 to Othman pasha from the Ministry of Defence can testify:

"The impudence of the enemy surpasses by

any limits: the present minute the fatherland costs on the brink of disaster; its fate is in hands of armies. There came the moment to render service to the people and the government, without sparing works, people for fatherland rescue. Use all efforts to arrive rather to the purpose of actions. "

the British ally Turkey also put efforts to help Turks to release the armies. On June 30 (on July 12), 1877 British offered mediation for a truce with Turkey to Montenegrins. The British consul who has specially been from Skutari with this offer, noted that "… after those sacrifice which Montenegro made three years, even her patroness and the ally would not find in that anything bad". The prince Nikolaevich Nicholas refused this services.

Suddenly shown participation London to the small principality was easily explainable. At this time Turks started taking away to Constantinople army Souleymane pasha which successfully and vigorously worked to Montenegro. Montenegrins hoped only for transition of the Russian army through Danube. As soon as it occurred, approach of Turks was immediately stopped. 4 on July (16) Souleymane's army began landing to transports in Antibari (sovr. Bar, Montenegro). 20 steamships transported 28 thousand infantrymen, 2 thousand. cavalrymen and 18 mountain tools in Dadeagach (sovr. Aleksandropolis, Greece). 7−9 on July (19−21) transportation and unloading ended. 10−11 on July (22−23) the army began to concentrate at Adrianople. The second capital of Ottoman army by this time had no garrison and was completely defenseless. Montenegro was saved. In Cetinje exulted.

Soon Souleymane's army acted as

to Bulgaria. The Viddinsky case Othman pasha obtained the order to move to Plevna. This city represented knot of highway roads — to Nikopol, Béla, Rushchuk, I Dodge, Karlovo, Traian, Filippopol and Sofia. Besides, two decent dirt roads conducted in Rakhovo and Viddin. Plevna was the traditional center grain trades. In 1876 of export from here almost was not, and in the city a significant amount of grain accumulated. Already on June 25 (on July 8), 1877 Plevna was occupied the fifty 30th Don Cossack regiment. In two days the city several times passed from hand to hand, thus bashibuzuki managed to cut out all Bulgarians who have shown for the first time the sympathies for Russians that made local Christians more careful.

Othman pasha was the courageous and initiative leader. First he even suggested to arrange raid on the Romanian party of Danube, but was refused. 1 on July (13) 17 thousand bayonets, 500 sabers at 58 tools acted in full view of 50 thousand Romanians defending Calafat on other coast of Danube (in the first of May Romanians offered Russian Federation the assistance beyond Danube, planning to besiege Viddin, but this offer was rejected; considering that it is quite enough exposed own forces, the government and command did not wish to give to Bucharest the right for any claims at conclusion of peace in the future). At movement at the coast of Danube Turks were fired by the Romanian artillery, however, without special success. As tools were recently transferred by the Russian party, at the battery there was the Russian officer. He insisted in touch with command. In 14.35 2 on July (14) Rumynsky Carl told the telegram to Nikolaevich Nicholas: "Outposts Calafat inform me that the big enemy column of 25 battalions with a cavalry, goes quickly to Lome-Palanke (i.e. downstream Danube — A.O.) . " In an hour the telegram was received, but to it did not attach special significance.

Early in the morning 4 on July (16) in the Rate received the message that Turks come nearer, whether there was it the telegram to which first did not pay attention, it is hard to say, but a disorder this news caused the very considerable. Protection of the emperor was carried out then only by one battalion, any solid data that occurs, was not. It was necessary to direct on investigation of the next vicinities and Sistovo the next squadron which has come hand. More than ever in this campaign absence in the Danube army of an army cavalry — i.e. its large connections which could provide control and information to that occurred on its flanks affected. These connections only were formed and had improvisational character, and therefore could not be strong and effectively operating. They could not prevent someone.

190-kilometer march from Viddin to Plevna Turks made

in 6 days almost absolutely unnoticed though his considerable part they moved along the river, without having opportunity to disappear. Nikolaevich Nicholas Sr., having 33 thousand sabers, preferred not to form of them a uniform strategic cavalry and sprayed this force, without having allocated for the right flank for distant investigation anything. Only 4 on July (16) from the Vienna newspaper in the Russian Main Apartment learned about movement of the Ottoman to Plevna, but the Grand Duke did not apprehend it seriously. After a capture Nikopol he considered that on the western direction the Turkish threat is finally finished. The Russian command continued to make one mistake for another. "There are two ways of actions: one — slow, methodical, but strong — was noted by Ignatyev looking at it — another — fast, resolute, but not without risk. The commander-in-chief managed to connect shortcomings of both ways of actions. We act constantly thoughtlessly, imprudently, but slowly. "

the Capture Nikopol the Commander-in-chief considered

as huge success. After fortress occupation, it had to be transferred to Romanians, but those did not hurry at all to transfer the armies to the Turkish coast, preferring to hold their houses. The reasons was much — and desire to keep independence, and to carry out own crossing through Danube in other place, and fears before possible (and in the circumstances in rather impossible blows (or attacks) Turks on the territory Romania. 5 on July (17) Nikolaevich Nicholas ordered to Kridener to hand over Nikopol to Romanians, but the commander of the 4th Romanian division refused to obey, motivating it with that the Romanian armies have own command and are not subject to Russian.

Rumynsky Carl such order did not give

, referring to that did not entrust Romanians participation in operations on the right coast of Danube. As a result in Nikopol there was the Russian garrison that excluded opportunity to concentrate all the case on the Pleven direction for Kridener. In the city there were about 6 thousand more captured soldiers and to 700 women and children. They could not be thrown without protection. The advanced parts of Romanians appeared in Nikopol only on July 17. Besides Kridener did not receive any information on movement of the opponent, but it had to provide a convoy and the food of the captured — it was necessary to do it first of all at the expense of poor stocks of the case. Backs lagged behind, armies had temporary problems and with cartridges. Quickly they could not act in such conditions. Actually at the disposal of Kridener there was no whole case — it still completely was not transported through Danube. Soon after the first progress of the Russian army failures followed.

6 (18) of July Othman learned about falling Nikopol — this day its armies did 58 versts and early in the morning 7 on July (19) entered Plevna. 6 on July (18) the Commander-in-chief repeated the order Kridenera to occupy Plevna at least with part of the case. 7 on July (19) to Plevna which was in 40 km. from Nikopol, the 5th infantry division of the lieutenant general Shilder Yu. I. - Shuldnera — 7 thousand bayonets, 1600 sabers was sent at 46 tools. This day, at some o'clock earlier, than the Russian advanced parts approached to it, the city included 17,5 thousand Turks with 58 tools. Armies Othman pasha at once started being dug round hastily. Next day Shilder-Shuldner attacked the city without investigation, without knowing about the number of the opponent (was considered that Turks in the city have no more than 4 battalions). The division was beaten off, having lost about 2,5 thousand people the killed and wounded.

Before a crossing through Danube some commanders convinced the soldiers that before them the weak, badly armed and trained opponent. "But at the first collisions there was all on the contrary. " — one of officers Remembered. Before attack of Plevna nobody doubted its success, were afraid only of one — that Turks will leave the city. In fight the technical superiority of the opponent was at once shown — kruppovsky tools were more long-range and skorostrelny, rifle fire was exclusively intensive. Its continuousness struck not only bodies of soldiers and officers, but also imagination. Accuracy of artillery of the opponent also was surprising. In the Russian army immediately there were hearings that it English officers operate. the 17th Arkhangelogorodsky and the 18th Vologda regiments seized heights over the city, but suffered thus heavy losses and were compelled to recede under counterstroke of 8 fresh camps.

Turks were tired with the forced march and are not ready to blow reflection by superior forces, but attack of one division beat off, having lost thus about 2 thousand people. The Russian armies showed mass heroism and worked so resolutely that Othman pasha, according to him, did not decide on prosecution. It was as it is impossible more the best exit from the developed situation — at withdrawal it became clear that our armies spent cartridges and shells. In some cases receding parts were mixed, the disorder led to a panic. Eventually from residents of Vologda and artillery it was succeeded to create rather strong rear guard which covered withdrawal. Nevertheless many commanders were sure that in case of prosecution survived at storm would be destroyed. Unpleasant surprises were not limited to Plevna. 7 on July (19) attack failure suddenly responded on a crossing through Danube.

Ogromny Bridge, approaches to it and road from the bridge to Sistov were constantly occupied with infinite columns of vehicles which carried all necessary for army. The organization of movement on this strategically important crossing was useless, its cover ashore — obviously insufficient. The drunk Cossack with a naked checker jumped on the bridge with shout "Turks in the city! ". The alarmist was stopped by the chief of guard who threatened to shoot down it from the revolver. But shout it appeared enough that the panic began. The order on road was almost instantly lost, obozny and Bulgarians in horror rushed to the bridge.

"Everywhere where you will look — were remembered by the witness of the incident — the same terrible picture: everywhere the frenzied faces disfigured by fear and despair, tearing apart soul and heart groans, shouts and crying of wounded from the hospitals, full of inexpressible torments, tear you; but you not to help them with forces. People stop being people; these are furious and blood-thirsty animals, without pity and compassion, in a word, deprived of all human feelings … Single faces of soldiers, officers, sailors, doctors, sisters of mercy, hospital attendants, volunteers of the Bulgarian militia, the Bulgarian clergy, all this runs in the most impossible suits because the panic found many in a bed and after a lunch dream. Wounded from hospitals which can run, too run, reserving blood pools. Everywhere you see the covered with wounds horses and buffalo s, and all this mixed up in one shapeless weight … In the middle of the river, and also at the bridge, there are a lot of the drowning people who are desperately appealing about the help, but it is vain: to them cannot and will not give a helping hand; because to everyone only to themselves, and storming waves of Danube freely absorb a set of victims. "

the Huge number of people was trampled by

in a crush, certainly, first of all suffered weak — women, children and wounded. The overturned vehicle instantly led to a barricade from bodies and subjects. By some miracle running did not dare the bridge, pontoons from an overload left under water. The panic and chaos proceeded about two and a half hours. Spent its local population started plundering the left warehouses, but was stopped by remained military. Eventually at entrance on the bridge the small group of pontoner turned some vehicles and behind this improvised blockage managed to protect a crossing and to stop a panic. At this time the Rate received the message with the Cossack that near Sistov Turks act, and on a crossing the chaos reigns. Considering that the only crossing from the Rate was separated only by 5 versts, it was possible to expect anything. From Kridener messages yet were not, and the emperor and the commander-in-chief with a staff was covered by only three hundred escort. As a result the Rate under this cover moved to Sistovo. As a result of this specific rekognostsirovka it became clear that the alarm was false.

it became clear

Later that transports with the wounded departing from under Plevna to hospitals in Sistovo became the reason of all. Only after that the incident which has threatened the bridge through which supply of the Danube army was supported, its command went to a number of measures for strengthening controls over Sistovo. Round the city guard were established, protection of approaches to the bridge is strengthened. Now to it threatened nothing, behind an exception ledostava and an ice drift. Rafts of the bridge suffered in December, 1877 and January, 1878, but were quickly restored. The bridge continued to serve and after war, and was finally divorced and sorted on September 25 (on October 6), 1878.

"Bloody fight of the 3rd near Nikopol, then failure near Plevna — were noted 10 on July (22) by Milyutin — at the same time received news of the Turkish forces arriving from all directions made sober our young commander-in-chief; he saw that the success of our army is not so provided at all as at first sight it seemed that it is necessary to run business more carefully." Care was shown that Nikolaevich Nicholas started hurrying Kridener, ordering it to repeat attack. Kridener started collecting everything in a fist that only could, being going to execute an order. To some extent it was the desperate decision. "With mobile Othman-pasheyu where it would not go — Sollogub remembered — it was not difficult to cope. It was difficult to cope with its immovability and that is why it was driven in the earth and, so to speak, hardened in it, throwing up a flame and death from uncountable cracks of the ambush." It attracted to herself all free forces of the Danube army, excepting possibility of concentration on the Constantinople direction.

Meanwhile Gurko beyond the Balkans sent to

to attacks small cavalry parties for the purpose of damage of a cloth of iron roads and cable lines. Some tens versts were put out of action, however it did not prevent the opponent to throw army Souleymane pasha to Filippopol. 16 on July (28) on the killed Turk the letter testifying to concentration of this army against the Russian group was taken. The Turkish population in its back — Eski Zagra (sovr. It is old Suntan, Bulgaria) and Kazanlak — started behaving more and more provocatively. In a number of places beating of the Bulgarian population began, escaping people left there where there were Russian parts and brought news that Souleymane's army concentrates for attack.

16 (28) of July Gurko appealed to the Commander-in-chief about an immediate prisylka of reinforcements as in 5−6 days when, by calculations of the general, the opponent will take the offensive, will be late. "Thus I consider as a holy duty to inform your Imperial Highness — Gurko reported — that our retreat will be accompanied by universal beating of all Bulgarian population Yeski Zagra and Kazanlak and all villages of a valley of Tundzhi. I shudder at thought that temporary our stay in these parts will be the cause of so awful fate of inhabitants of this area. I will not hide also that our retreat to mountains and then a secondary exit in Tundzhi's valley, in a type of the encouraged army, without any doubt, will cost also to us enormous victims. "

the Destiny of a valley of Tundzhi completely depended now on destiny of Plevna, Gurko understood it and fixedly watched a city siege. Instead of the Grand Duke the commander of the Advance party was answered immediately by Nikolaevich Nicholas. Nepokoychitsky General informed — to a capture of Plevna of reinforcements will not be, Kridener prepares for storm, and Gurko receives a freedom of action. This day, observing the semi-thrown and burning villages, one of staff officers of the Grand Duke, noticed — "… everything is somehow unusually desolate". Everything that it was possible to make — it to concentrate a maximum of forces on the direction of possible blow of the opponent. Gurko and arrived, having collected to 18 on July (30) under Eni-Yeski Zagra (sovr. Nova Zagora, Bulgaria) 13 battalions, 16,5 squadrons and 42 tools from 16,5 battalions which were available for it, 25 squadrons and 44 tools. Remained provided retreat ways to the Balkans.

Kridener who has Approached to Plevna carried out a rekognostsirovka which revealed a superiority of the opponent in forces. If earlier the number of Turks underestimated, now started overestimating, was called the figure about 60 thousand people 14 on July (26) under the leadership of Kridener the meeting which boats spoke against storm was held. Kridener informed on the plans of the Grand Duke, and on the same day Nikolaevich Nicholas completely approved them. The commander of the IX case understood this approval as the order though the direct order and even the signature of the Grand Duke was not — his opinion was delivered by a package signed by the gen. Levitsky. 17 on July (29) Kridener held again meeting concerning attack of Plevna. The opinion of staff officers and commanders of connections did not change — they were against storm, but were ready to execute the order. On the night of 18(30) the attack disposition was prepared — in the morning it was brought to armies.

17 (29) of July Romanians, at last, entered Nikopol, and 18 the history near Plevna repeated on July (30), only this time the city stormed already Kridener's all case — 27 thousand bayonets, 2800 sabers at 176 tools. Othman had already 23,5 thousand people at 58 tools. It should be noted that it were generally the armies which had behind shoulders experience of war with Serbia — to Plevna Othman took the best parts in a campaign. Already before a campaign the right conclusion was drawn on importance of shooting fight — each infantryman received on 500 cartridges — an inconceivable stock for the Russian army. The Russian infantryman in the order before attack was recommended to protect cartridges, to begin fire only with 600 steps to the enemy, whenever possible to be limited to a bayonet, not to extend at chain attack "in a thread", etc. In fight very poor quality of the Russian artillery — in 2 hours of the attack preceding storm was again shown, it could not suppress any Turkish battery. the 4-pound field gun could make nothing with field strengthenings, and 9-pound tools was insufficiently. Fortunately, fire of the Turkish tools this time was also ineffective.

Turks managed to strengthen only positions in the northeast and the city East, but on them, without preliminary investigation, it is simple on the shortest line, there came the Russian armies. Coordination of actions was also weak. Attacking had no opportunity to study positions, since morning the fog which has very complicated coordination of actions was established. The soil which has softened from moisture worsened conditions of movement of infantry, on the other hand, fog covered its movement from aim fire of the defending. After fog left, armies started sustaining essential losses from rifle fire of the opponent. Nevertheless, they made success on a number of the directions. However, without the good organization it was impossible to fix it. Attacks of Kridener of part being suitable for strengthening attacked without communication with each other, and were doomed to a failure.

"Undoubtedly — were noted in the diary by Gazenkampf — that attack of Plevna was Vedeno remarkably unskillfully. The front of attack was stretched on eighteen versts; both case commanders acted separately, without communication and system, even knowing nothing about each other. Skobelev with the small group acted too separately and independently. The reserve was not. "

Especially persistent and difficult fights went for the Grivitsky redoubt. They did not end even after sunset, however, firing practice and bayonet duels were not so organized, and they gradually started coming to naught. Other exit was not — Kridener had no reserves which could support parts fighting almost all day. "The second Plevna" ended with almost full defeat of the attacking, lost 1 general, 168 officers, 7167 privates and corporals with wounded and the killed. Armies in a disorder receded to Sistov.

Command did not cope with the withdrawal organization at night, after a difficult fight when "… it was necessary to recede and night was the witness to turmoil unprecedented. All parts mixed up, retreat assumed an accident air. " The discipline was lost, the soldiers who have lost commanders, crowd went to a crossing. At this moment all reserve of the Grand Duke equaled to 3 regiments of infantry and 3 regiments of a cavalry which he and decided to move personally under Plevna for stability giving receding and for reflection of possible attack of the opponent. It was very timely and correct decision. At the last stage of fight the opponent counterattacked the broken receding. The crossing at Sistovo was covered with only two companies of the 124th infantry Voronezh regiment, strengthenings were not. It is not surprising that at hearing that the cavalry Othman pasha broke to Sistovo, the panic there began. However, armies managed to overcome quickly enough it and to restore an order. Total number of the Russian armies on this direction equaled to 25 638 bayonets, 3349 sabers and to 186 tools. By July 20 (on August 1) the Pleven garrison grew to 48 battalions and 12 squadrons at 54 tools — 29,7 thousand people. The Russian investigation obviously lost control over a situation and estimated forces Othman pasha at 60 thousand people. The full and unanimous confidence to these data was not, however danger was very great. The maximum efforts the general reserve could be increased to 2,5 divisions.

It meant that for a certain moment the Danube army remained without glavnokomandovaniye since it concentrated on management of this reserve. Fortunately and the Turks who have lost about 5 thousand people., could not organize prosecution.

Ayrapetov Oleg